National Culture and Union Membership : A Cultural-Cognitive Perspective by A. Posthuma, Richard
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 
"National Culture and Union Membership: A Cultural-Cognitive Perspective"
 
Richard A. Posthuma
Relations industrielles / Industrial Relations, vol. 64, n° 3, 2009, p. 507-529.
 
 
 
Pour citer cet article, utiliser l'information suivante :
 
URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/038554ar
DOI: 10.7202/038554ar
Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 12 février 2017 07:32
National Culture and Union Membership:
A Cultural-Cognitive Perspective
richard A. Posthuma
Comparing Hofstede and GloBE deepens our understanding of the influence of 
different measures and dimensions of national culture on union membership. data 
from the World values Survey were matched to GloBE and Hofstede country culture 
scores (n = 43,867 employees, 32 countries). Union membership was positively 
related to GloBE’s institutional Collectivism, but not Hofstede’s individualism; and 
was negatively related to both Performance orientation (GloBE) and Masculinity 
(Hofstede), suggesting that differences in culture measures may account for prior 
inconsistent findings. Curvilinear relationships between union membership and 
age (inverted U-shaped) and Uncertainty avoidance (U-shaped) suggest that 
Uncertainty avoidance may explain why younger and older people were less likely 
to be union members.
KEYWordS: Unions, collectivism, performance orientation
overview
institutions are resilient social structures that grow because of their perceived legit-
imacy (Scott, 2001). Labour unions are institutions that may flourish when they are 
perceived as legitimate (Bronfenbrenner, 1997; Hurd, Milkman and Turner, 2003). This 
study extends prior research on union membership in several ways. First, extant research 
has focused on legitimacy derived from regulative and normative foundations. Because 
those foundations have provided only partial and mixed results in explaining union 
membership across countries (Calmfors et al., 2001; Kuruvilla, Gallagher and Wetzel, 
1993), this study offers a behavioural perspective that is based on a cultural-cognitive 
foundation (Scott, 2001; Lewin and Feuille, 1983). Second, much of the prior research 
on union membership has focused on the U.S. and other western countries (Cregan, 
2005). Studies from the U.S. cannot explain the persistent and widely varying levels of 
union membership across countries or cultures (Lansbury and Baird, 2004). This study 
uses national culture to explain these differences. Third, prior research has focused on 
either micro-level individual factors or on macro-level factors, such as economic trends 
or country cultures (Black, 2001; Clark and oswald, 1993; Premack and Hunter, 1988; 
Singh, 2001). Using recently developed multilevel analytical techniques that enable 
research to cross levels of analysis (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002; Singer, 1998), this 
study integrates micro- and macro-level streams of research through a cultural-cognitive 
theoretical framework (Scott, 2001). This study explains why prior research did not find 
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a significant relationship between collectivism and union membership. This study also 
deepens our understanding of the curvilinear relationships between union member-
ship on one hand, and age and uncertainty avoidance on the other. Finally, this study 
enhances understanding of national culture by comparing Hofstede (2001) and GLoBE 
project measures (House et al., 2004).
institutional Pillars
Neo-institutional theory identifies three pillars or foundations for conducting research 
related to organizations: regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive. The first two 
pillars correspond to prior theories that have been applied to the study of union 
membership.
The regulative pillar emphasizes how institutions establish rules and regulations and 
enforce sanctions to constrain and influence behaviour (North, 1989). The regulative pil-
lar corresponds to theories about inducing people to become union members through 
regulatory pressures so as to avoid free riders. Regulatory factors related to union mem-
bership have included union dues, laws related to union membership, works councils, 
union shop clauses, and so on (Calmfors et al., 2001; olson, 1971; Ullman, 1975). 
These forces suggest that even rational employees might not be motivated by their own 
self interest to voluntarily choose to become union members because they could act as 
free riders benefiting from the collective action of the group (olson, 1971). 
The normative pillar emphasizes the influence of social obligations that create a 
stable social order (Stinchcombe, 1997). The normative pillar corresponds to prior 
research related to social customs and social norms influencing choices to become 
union members (Clark et al., 1993; Fullager et al., 1995). Union membership studies 
that are normative have focused on how values and beliefs about unions influence 
individuals’ choices about whether to join a union (Youngblood et al., 1984).
The cultural-cognitive pillar emphasizes the influence of culture as the context 
that shapes cognitions related to institutions. Because the environment within which 
institutions operate can significantly influence how they are perceived (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977), and because institutions operate within different contexts in coun-
tries with different national cultures, national culture can influence how individuals 
react to and perceive institutions such as labour unions. Different cultures can provide 
more or less support for the perceived legitimacy of organizations (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977; Scott, 2001). 
This cultural cognitive pillar is proposed as a new and different way of studying 
differences in union membership. Numerous studies have shown that national cul-
ture significantly influences perceptions, cognitions, and behaviours (Hofstede, 2001; 
House et al., 2004). The impact of culture is thought to derive from its influence on 
the collective programming of minds of individuals within different cultures (Hofstede, 
2001). Because people in some cultures think differently than those in other cultures, 
it is logical to expect that their choices and behaviours will also be different. This study 
proposes specific hypotheses about how the collective programming of individuals in 
different cultures is likely to influence their choices to become union members. 
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individual-level demographic differences
Prior work has shown that individual differences are important in predicting union 
membership (Premack and Hunter, 1988; Schnabel and Wagner, 2007). Thus, this 
study measures the effects of these differences on union membership at the individu-
al level. Cultural effects are assessed after controlling for the hypothesized individual-
level differences.
Sex. Women are often more positively disposed towards unions than men (New-
ton and Shore, 1992), and it is only because women tend to hold jobs that are less 
likely to be unionized that union membership rates appear higher among men (Price 
and Bain, 1983; Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Voos, 1983). However, a desire for social 
support can more strongly influence women than men to be union members, and 
these social influences often influence voting for union representation (Youngblood 
et al., 1984). Unions provide a type of legitimate institutionalized social support re-
garding work matters that women desire for issues such as gender discrimination and 
participation in decisions (Schur and Kruse, 1992). Therefore,
HyPotHESiS 1: After controlling for occupational differences, women are more likely than 
men to be union members.
Education. Cross-cultural research on the influence of education on union member-
ship has had mixed results. Education was not related to union membership in india, 
but it was negatively related to union membership in the U.S. (Deshpande and Joseph, 
1997) and among firefighters in Hong Kong (Snape and Chan, 2000). Still, other stud-
ies show that, controlling for occupation, education increases the desire to join unions 
(Hundley, 1988, 1989; van den Berg and Groot, 1992). A rationale for the combined 
effects of occupation and education can be derived from the influence of education 
on earning capacity and job mobility. Job-specific education is positively correlated 
with union membership, whereas overall general education is negatively correlated 
with union membership (Hundley, 1989). Job-specific training enhances the value of 
union membership in terms of increased wages gained through collective bargaining, 
whereas general education increases job mobility (Baron, Davis-Blake and Bielby, 1986; 
Hundley, 1989). Thus, controlling for occupational differences, more highly educated 
individuals were more likely to be union members (Hundley, 1988). Therefore,
HyPotHESiS 2: After controlling for occupation, education will be positively related to 
union membership.
Occupation. in the U.S., blue-collar workers are more likely to vote in favour of 
union representation than are white-collar workers such as supervisors and profes-
sionals (Youngblood et al., 1984). However, international research has not resolved 
the question of whether there are occupational differences in union membership 
across cultures. one study found very few occupational differences were significant 
predictors of union membership in the Netherlands (van den Berg and Groot, 1992). 
Nevertheless, it is expected that supervisors are generally less likely to be union mem-
bers because they will identify with management, and their loyalty to the firm is 
more important than loyalty to a union (Duncan and Stafford, 1980). Professionals are 
less likely to be union members because they benefit from their professional status 
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through job movement instead of collective action (Hundley, 1988, 1989; Strauss, 
1964). They also tend to work for smaller employers, where smaller numbers of em-
ployees hinder unionization (Price and Bain, 1983; van den Berg and Groot, 1992). 
Therefore,
HyPotHESiS 3: Supervisors and Professional Employees are less likely to be union members 
than are other workers.
Age. The influence of age on union membership is more complex than a simple 
unidirectional relationship. Blanchflower (2007) observed an inverted U-shaped rela-
tionship between worker age and union membership. He found evidence that this 
relationship holds even after controlling for cohort effects (i.e. decade of birth). Wad-
dington and Whitston (1997) found that younger workers’ reasons for joining unions 
(e.g., desire for training) were significantly different from those of older workers (e.g., 
job security). Moreover, a curvilinear relationship between job tenure and unioniza-
tion has been shown in the Netherlands, where workers with lower and higher years 
of job tenure are less likely to be union members (van den Berg and Groot, 1992). 
Data from india show a similar curvilinear relationship between age and union mem-
bership (Gani, 1996). 
This convex curvilinear relationship may be explained by the risk-reward trade-off 
inherent in the decision to join a union (Bryson et al., 2005). Unions present possible 
rewards in terms of increased wages and benefits, which could be offset by em-
ployer resistance to the cost of unionization that could take the form of retribution 
from employers and work disruptions (e.g., strikes) that could put wages in jeopardy 
(Allen, 1995; Dickens, 1983). Moreover, younger workers tend to be less attached 
to their employers and for younger workers, the benefits of unionization in terms of 
higher earnings are often too far in the future to be deemed of value (Linz, 2004). For 
middle-aged workers, the potential rewards from unionization are greater, since these 
workers are more attached to their employers and have more years remaining before 
retirement to reap the benefits. For middle-aged workers, the reward-to-risk ratio 
favours the reward, increasing union membership. older workers have fewer years 
to reap the benefits of unionization because they are closer to retirement. For older 
workers, the reward-to-risk ratio does not favour union membership (Brockerman, 
2004). This expected curvilinear relationship is illustrated in Figure 1. Therefore,
HyPotHESiS 4: Age will have a convex curvilinear relationship with union membership, with 
younger and older workers less likely to be union members.
national Culture as a Contextual influence  
on union membership
Prior research has indicated that employees’ attitudes toward unions in different 
countries can influence the likelihood of union membership (Schnabel and Wagner, 
2007). However, very little research has used national cultural attitudes as predictors 
of union membership. This is unfortunate since national culture has proven to pre-
dict many other work-related outcomes, and is therefore a likely predictor of union 
membership.
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Figure 1
expected relationship between union Membership, Age, and uncertainty Avoidance
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National culture has been referred to as programming of the minds of individu-
als within a culture that produces a system of relatively permanent and transferrable 
tendencies (Hofstede, 2001). As such, it is likely to influence how people evaluate 
organizations such as labour unions and their decisions about whether to become 
members thereof. Since countries have different cultures, it is expected that the way 
people evaluate union membership will differ across countries, and this will result in 
differing rates of union membership. 
Two prior studies examined the relationship between Hofstede culture dimensions 
and union density, with mixed results. Black (2001) matched Hofstede culture scores 
to union density figures for 19 countries in four different years between 1970 and 
1995 and found that the Uncertainty Avoidance dimension was negatively related to 
union density and that the Power Distance and individualism dimensions were not 
significantly related to union density. Singh (2001) matched Hofstede culture dimen-
sions to union density figures for 33 countries in 1985 and 1995 and found that the 
Masculinity and Power Distance dimensions were negatively related to union density, 
while Uncertainty Avoidance and individualism were not significantly related to union 
density. The lack of a significant relationship between individualism and union density 
in both studies is surprising, since individualism is the opposite of Collectivism, a cul-
tural dimension that one would expect to increase union density. Notably, however, 
neither of these studies controlled for individual differences in sex, age, education, or 
occupation, even though these factors are likely to predict union membership. 
Comparing Cultural Frameworks
To further examine the relationships between national culture and union member-
ship, this study uses two different conceptualizations of culture: the Hofstede (2001) 
framework—which, although popular, has been criticized by some (McSweeney, 
2002)—and the Global Leadership and organizational Behaviour Effectiveness 
(GLoBE) measures (House et al., 2004). The GLoBE measures overlap with, but are 
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both conceptually and empirically distinguishable from, the Hofstede measures (Hof-
stede, 2001). The culture dimensions described below are used to test the influence 
of culture on union membership. 
Performance Orientation. GLoBE conceptualizes Performance orientation as the 
degree to which a society encourages the improvement of performance and achieve-
ment (House et al., 2004). Cultures with higher levels of Performance orientation 
tend to confer status based on individual accomplishments instead of seniority, social 
connections, and so forth (Schneider and Barsoux, 1997). Workers who are satisfied 
with job characteristics such as the possibility of achievement through advancement 
opportunities are less likely to vote for a labour union (Jarley and Fiorito, 1991). Thus, 
where achievement is valued, an orientation towards acquiring job rewards through 
performance is more likely, and an orientation towards achieving job rewards through 
ascribed status obtained through factors often promoted by labour unions (e.g., sen-
iority) is diminished. 
Hofstede (2001) did not conceptualize or measure performance orientation as 
a separate dimension of national culture. Rather, it can be seen that it was part of 
Hofstede’s Masculinity dimension of national culture. Therefore, it is expected that 
the GLoBE Performance orientation measure will be negatively related to union 
membership. However, since performance orientation is also embedded within Hofst-
ede’s Masculinity, it is likely that union membership will also be negatively related to 
Masculinity. Therefore 
HyPotHESiS 5: Performance orientation will be negatively related to union membership.
Institutional and In-Group Collectivism. Collectivism is the degree to which people 
view themselves as integrated with others through social interactions and sublimate 
their personal desires to those of the group (Triandis, 1994). The opposite of Collectiv-
ism is individualism, which is the degree to which individuals act independently based 
on their own personal interests. Hofstede studied this as a unitary construct (Hofstede, 
2001). The two societal-level studies of the relationship between union membership 
and Hofstede’s individualism failed to find a significant relationship (Black, 2001; Singh, 
2001). This is surprising because collective action is at the heart of what unions do 
(Freeman and Medoff, 1984). Unions advocate that workers deal with the employer as 
a collective, thereby enhancing their bargaining power (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). 
Therefore, Collectivism should be positively related to union membership. 
Unlike Hofstede’s unidimensional measure focused on individualism, the GLoBE 
project focused on the opposite pole, collectivism, and divided it into two constructs: 
institutional and in-group Collectivism. institutional Collectivism is the degree to 
which a society engages and rewards collective efforts such as group cohesion, col-
lective interests, group goals, laws, social programs, and so on (House et al., 2004). 
in-Group Collectivism is the degree to which societies rely on interdependence within 
families or organizations (House et al., 2004).
institutional Collectivism is high in cultures that emphasize civic virtue and col-
lective interests. in those cultures, unions are more likely to be seen as legitimate 
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institutions, and union membership will be higher (Cregan, 2005; Newton and Shore, 
1992). Therefore, institutional Collectivism should be positively related to union 
membership. When unions are viewed as legitimate institutions (e.g., using internal 
democracy), workers are more likely to vote in favour of union representation (Bron-
fenbrenner, 1997). Thus, the legitimacy of the institutional collective can increase 
union membership. Further, cultures that emphasize the importance of citizenship 
in society (i.e., civic virtue) have higher levels of union membership (Beaumont and 
Harris, 1998). in some countries, this may be a function of the legacy of Communist 
governments (Blanchflower and Freeman, 1997). 
in contrast, in-Group Collectivism is the degree to which families and work groups 
are valued and important (House et al., 2004). Social identity and self-categorization 
theories posit that individuals classify themselves into categories or groups (Tajfel 
and Turner, 1986) and enhance their self-esteem through repeated positive evalua-
tions of groups to which they belong, or “in-groups,” compared to other groups, or 
“out-groups.” in cultures where families and work groups are more highly valued, 
other groups such as labour unions will be perceived more negatively, and the result 
of group comparison processes will have a negative impact on union membership. 
Therefore, 
HyPotHESiS 6: institutional Collectivism will be positively related to union membership, 
and in-group Collectivism will be negatively related to union membership.
Power Distance. Power Distance is the degree to which a society accepts that 
people have unequal levels of power, status, and authority (House et al., 2004). Since 
unions strive to influence employers’ decisions, they are attempting to reduce the 
power differential—or Power Distance—between the management and workers. 
Unions would seek to reduce this Power Distance through gaining more members. in 
countries where their union membership efforts have been less successful, it may be 
due to the acceptance of employees of higher Power Distance. Thus, countries with 
a higher Power Distance dimension would be expected to have lower levels of union 
membership because workers in those countries are more willing to let their employ-
ers take the power to make decisions. Therefore,
HyPotHESiS 7: Power Distance will be negatively related to union membership.
Humane Orientation. Humane orientation is the extent to which a society sup-
ports and promotes fairness, friendliness, generosity, caring and kindness towards 
others (House et al., 2004). Hofstede’s Masculinity (MAS) index captures some aspects 
of Humane orientation. However, with Hofstede, a humane orientation is partially 
conceptualized as femininity, indicating low levels of MAS. Thus, low MAS suggests a 
more humane orientation within a culture. 
Even though employees within a culture may be willing to accept higher Power 
Distance in decision making, they may nevertheless expect that employees be treated 
humanely by those with power. This is exemplified in Hispanic cultures where the boss 
is sometimes called “el patrón” in Spanish meaning that he is the accepted authority 
figure. With the acceptance of his role as the authority, there is also a concomitant 
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expectation that the authority figure will take care of the people under his authority 
(Howell et al., 2007). Thus, there is no contradiction in predicting a negative relation-
ship between Power Distance and Union Membership and, at the same time, a posi-
tive relationship between Humane orientation and Union Membership. Singh (2001) 
found a negative relationship between MAS and union density and suggested that 
this was caused by unions’ emphasis on caring for others and quality of life factors 
that reflect a humane orientation (Singh, 2001). Therefore,
HyPotHESiS 8: Humane orientation will be positively related to union membership.
Uncertainty Avoidance. Uncertainty Avoidance indicates that rules and consistency 
are more important than a tolerance for ambiguity (House et al., 2004). Research on 
the influence of Uncertainty Avoidance on union membership has produced incon-
sistent results: Black (2001) found that Hofstede’s Uncertainty Avoidance index (UAi) 
was negatively related to union density, while Singh (2001) found that Hofstede’s UAi 
was not significantly related to union density. However, workers seek union represen-
tation to reduce the uncertainty about what might happen if they have a problem at 
work (Waddington and Whitston, 1997), and unions do actually increase job security 
in Great Britain (Bender and Sloane, 1999). 
However, a curvilinear relationship between Uncertainty Avoidance and union 
membership could account for the inconsistent findings of prior cross-cultural research. 
Bender and Sloane (1999) found that, for non-union workers, there is a curvilinear rela-
tionship between job tenure and job security: those with low or high levels of job tenure 
had lower levels of perceived job security than those with moderate levels of job tenure. 
However, for union members, job security increased linearly with increased job tenure.
Moreover, a U-shaped curvilinear relationship between Uncertainty Avoidance and 
union membership may also help to explain the inverted U-shaped relationship be-
tween age and union membership. Some evidence suggests an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between age and a sense of wellbeing and happiness (Blanchflower and 
oswald, 2006). Thus, as middle-aged workers become less satisfied with their lives, 
they seek the possible help that union membership could provide to them in terms of 
increased wages, benefits, and job security. Moreover, since they are less concerned 
with avoiding uncertainty during this middle-aged period of their lives, they are more 
willing to accept the risks linked to union membership such as strikes, employer retri-
bution, the uncertain outcome of collective bargaining negotiations, etc. For middle-
aged workers, the risk to reward trade off induces them to be more favourably dis-
posed toward union membership. 
The hypothesized curvilinear relationship between Uncertainty Avoidance and 
union membership is illustrated in Figure 1. This relationship is supported by the curvi-
linear subjective value function discussed in Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1981), where the concept of Uncertainty Avoidance is similar to Prospect Theory’s 
concept of risk avoidance. Prospect Theory postulates a concave, curvilinear relation-
ship between levels of loss and subjective perceived value. At lower and higher levels 
of Uncertainty Avoidance, changes in the perceived value of union representation 
will be relatively greater than at moderate levels of Uncertainty Avoidance. For those 
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cultures with low or high levels of Uncertainty Avoidance, then, the potential incre-
mental benefits of union representation will be perceived as greater than for those in 
cultures with moderate levels of uncertainty avoidance. Therefore,
HyPotHESiS 9: Uncertainty Avoidance will have a concave curvilinear relationship with union 
membership such that, at low and high levels of Uncertainty Avoidance, 
Union Membership will be greater than at moderate levels of Uncertainty 
Avoidance.
methods
This study used data from three different sources, the World Values Survey (WVS), 
the GLoBE Project, and Hofstede (Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004; inglehart et 
al., 2004). individual survey responses from the WVS from different countries were 
matched with country-level culture scores, and this mixed level of analysis was used to 
capture both individual-level and culture-level factors (Smith and Schwartz, 1997).
WVS data included sex, age, education, occupation, and whether individuals 
were union members (inglehart et al., 2004). Data were collected in many countries 
between 1999 and, 2002 using personal interviews conducted in the respondents’ 
native languages. Respondents were shown a list of organizations and asked which 
ones they belonged to. Responses to the item “labour union” were coded as: 
1 = Belong, 0 = Not Mentioned.
Country-level culture scores from the GLoBE project measured national culture on 
several dimensions (House et al., 2004): Performance orientation indicates that re-
wards for improvement are valued; Future orientation values the importance of plan-
ning for the future as opposed to accepting the current state or condition; Gender 
Egalitarianism values equal roles for men and women (House et al., 2004); Assertive-
ness values toughness and dominance as opposed to tenderness; institutional Collec-
tivism values the importance of societal and organizational level loyalties as opposed 
to individual interests; in-group Collectivism values smaller work groups, families, etc. 
as opposed to individual interests; Power Distance values deference to leaders and 
more concentration of power at higher levels; Humane orientation values sensitivity 
towards and concern for other people; and Uncertainty Avoidance values orderli-
ness, structure, and formal procedures as opposed to ambiguity. GLoBE provides two 
sets of these culture dimensions: one for society practices (i.e., how things are) and 
one for society values (i.e., how things should be). The Society Practices scores were 
used because these scores use respondents as key informants about their cultures, a 
method that can reduce the likelihood of responses being swayed by social desirabil-
ity (Aycan, Kanungo, and Sinha, 1999). All nine GLoBE dimensions of culture were 
included in the multivariate analysis to perform a robust analysis.
Data from the WVS and GLoBE were merged, using country as the matching vari-
able. Persons were selected for inclusion in this study if they reported that they were 
full-time employees, and each individual who responded to the WVS was assigned 
the country-level culture scores from their country, resulting in multiple individual-
level responses within a country. 
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The Hofstede national culture scores were derived from managers working for iBM 
in various countries between 1967 and 1973 and were supplemented by estimates 
of country culture scores from subsequent studies (Hofstede, 2001). in the Hofst-
ede national culture scores, Power Distance indicates greater fear of and deference 
to bosses; Uncertainty Avoidance indicates a desire to evade insecurity by follow-
ing rules, continuing employment, and reducing stress; individualism indicates higher 
preference for work that includes personal challenges, discretion, and free time; and 
Masculinity indicates higher preference for social interactions, with higher stress and 
an ego-centered focus on recognition and advancement, as opposed to maintaining 
relationships. As with GLoBE culture scores, Hofstede country culture scores were 
matched to individual responses.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations between the study 
variables. Data on the number of responses from each country in the WVS, and the 
countries to which individuals were matched for GLoBE and Hofstede culture scores, 
are available from the author on request. The correlations between culture measures 
are at the country level. Also available will be the country level percentages of respond-
ents who indicated that they belong to a union, with the frequency of union mem-
bership ranging from a low of 0.8% in Morocco to a high of 63.9% in Sweden. For 
comparison purposes, adjusted union density rates estimated by Visser (2006) were 
matched with the individual union membership reports from the 15 countries used in 
this study. Visser’s estimates of union density, which are adjusted estimates based on 
government figures and union membership reports, are generally higher than estimates 
of union membership based on the WVS, so the estimates of union membership in this 
study are more conservative. Estimates of union density can vary both over time and 
by method of measurement (Blanchflower and Freeman, 1992; Cohen et al., 2003). 
However, the pattern of union membership across countries is similar, and there is a 
significant and positive correlation between the country union density estimates based 
on the WVS and those reported by Visser (Kendall τ
b
 = .54, p < .01; Pearson bivariate 
r = .88, p < .01; Spearman ρ = .71, p < .01). Thus, the cross-country comparisons in this 
study are appropriate, given that the focus here is on capturing the influence of culture, 
rather than on administrative reports of union membership. Further, using estimates 
from the WVS employed a consistent data collection method and enabled tests of both 
individual-level variables and country-culture scores from a wide range of cultures.
 However, this study does not measure nor is intended to measure union density 
(membership as a proportion of wage and salary earners). Union density is often 
seen as one indicator of union strength (Blaschke, 2000). By contrast, this is a study 
focused on individuals and their union membership. That is why this study uses data 
from individuals reporting for themselves whether they report that they are union 
members. it is not surprising that there are differences between self-reports of union 
membership status and official records of union density, since the methods by which 
the union density figures are collected vary widely across countries because of the 
different meanings of being covered by union contract or being a union member that 
diverge significantly across countries and cultures. in fact, one strength of this study is 
that it does not use union density, but rather individual reports of union membership 
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status that tapped into divergent groups of employees with varying levels of union 
density and thereby enhanced the generalizability of the findings. Therefore, there is a 
greater degree of confidence that the relationships found in this study are not bound 
or limited to the methods that official agencies use to calculate union density for a 
country. Moreover, this study adds to our understanding of the union membership 
literature because it uses one consistent question format to ask individuals in different 
countries whether or not they are union members. The focus here is on individual 
cultural cognitions about membership status, because these are likely to be influenced 
by national culture. other published reports of union density are likely to be more 
accurate measures of national level union density (e.g., Blaschke, 2000; Visser, 2006).
measures
Demographic data were coded as: Sex (Male = 1, Female = 2), Age (in years), Educa-
tion (on a 1–to–7 scale with 1 = incomplete elementary education and 7 = completed 
university degree). Supervisors and Professionals were each coded as 1, and other 
occupations were coded with 0.
Because of the mixed levels of analysis (individual-level and country-level data), 
the SAS Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLiMMix) was used (SAS institute, 2005). 
Using fixed and random effects and slightly different terminology than Hierarchical 
Linear Modeling software (HLM), the SAS software also estimates a two-level model 
and provides similar results to other multi-level software such as HLM (Raudenbush 
and Bryk, 2002; Singer, 1998; McClean, Sanders and Stroup, 1991). This analysis 
uses unweighted data and includes observations where there are available country 
level scores. if a country level score is not available, that country is excluded from 
the multi-level analysis. This method addresses concerns with using aggregate level 
and individual characteristics data in the same model by partialling out the effects at 
different levels (Garcia, Posthuma, and Roehling, in Press; Moulton, 1990; SAS institute, 
2005). The GLiMMix procedure is a generalization of the SAS MixED procedure. That 
procedure enables the modeling of non-normally distributed outcomes. GLiMMix 
models conditional or subject-specific effects, as well as marginal or population-
averaged effects, without the need to create separate data files for the two different 
levels of analysis, as was required by some earlier versions of HLM. 
Like some other recently updated statistical software packages, GLiMMix can ana-
lyze data from a single data set and data in which the response variable is not normally 
distributed (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002; SAS institute, 2005; Singer, 1998). it does so 
by incorporating random effects in the model, thereby permitting subject-specific effects 
(conditional) as well as population averaged (marginal) inferences. This is accomplished by 
fitting a generalized mixed model based on linearizations and using a restricted pseudo-
likelihood method (Wolfinger and o’Connell, 1993). The GLiMix procedure assumes that 
E[Y|γ] = g–1 (xb + Zγ) in which g(.) is a differentiable link function that is monotonic. Matrix 
x (n x p) has rank k and the design matrix for random effects is Z (n x r). The inverse link 
function contains the linear mixed model and the model component is called the linear 
predictor: η = xb + Zγ. The A matrix contains the variance functions of the model and is 
diagonal, while the variance of observations is var[Y|γ] = A1/2 RA1/2 (SAS institute, 2005).
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results
Table 2 shows the results of the generalized linear mixed model using individual-level 
demographic variables from the WVS, and GLoBE culture scores to predict union 
membership. The intra-class correlation coefficient (Country iCC) represents the 
amount of variance between countries, calculated as: 
intercept covariance parameter estimate
intercept covariance parameter estimate + Residual covariance parameter estimate
(Bleise, 2000; Singer, 1998). Since the initial estimate for the intercept-only model 
indicated a significant amount of clustering within countries, an ordinary least-squares 
regression analysis of these data could yield misleading results (Singer, 1998). Thus, a 
mixed level of analysis was appropriate and needed.
tABLe 2
Hierarchical generalized Linear Mixed Model Predicting union Membership from individual Difference  
Variables and gLoBe Society Practices Culture Scores
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 intercept only Main effects Full Model
 Std B Se Std B Se Std B Se
intercept .12** .03 .11** .14 .11** .01
sex  -** - 3.36** .29 3.45** .29
age  -** - -1.05** .32 38.63** 1.55
education -** - 2.47** .36 2.37** .35
supervisors -** - -3.53** .30 -2.86** .29
professionals -** - -3.97** .32 -3.31** .32
performance orientation -** - -21.56** 6.04 -14.18** 5.97
Future orientation -** - -5.00** 6.01 -4.14** 5.30
Gender egalitarianism -** - 1.93** 3.76 -.28** 3.46
assertiveness -** - 3.63** 4.65 .94** 4.21
institutional collectivism -** - 14.79** 4.86 7.92** 4.86
in-Group collectivism -** - -5.62** 4.80 -8.67** 4.38
power distance -** - -6.48** 5.76 -5.71** 5.09
Humane orientation -** - 5.50** 3.89 7.28** 3.51
uncertainty avoidance -** - 15.83** 6.09 -96.61** 42.21
age2  -** - - - -40.36** 1.54
uncertainty avoidance2 -** - - - 107.79** 40.25
model: 
 Generalized X2 3,692.0** 3,615.2** 3,579.9** 
 -2 restricted log likelihood 16,108.4** 15,251.2** 14,839.7** 
 Δ df -** 14** 2** 
 Δ X2 -** 76.8** 35.3** 
 country icc .19** - - 
individual level variable labels are italicized.  n = 43,867. ** p < .01.  * p < .05.  std B = standardized coefficients. age2 = age squared, 
uncertainty avoidance2 = uncertainty avoidance squared. Δ df = change in degrees of freedom. Δ X2 = change in generalized X2.
To compare GLoBE to Hofstede, a separate GLiMMix analysis was performed 
and is reported in Table 3. Parameter estimates in Table 2 and 3 were used to test 
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the hypotheses. The data supported hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. Women were more 
likely than men to be union members. Controlling for occupations, those with higher 
education were more likely to be union members. Professionals and supervisors were 
less likely to be union members. 
tABLe 3
Hierarchical generalized Linear Mixed Model Predicting union Membership from individual Difference  
Variables and HoFSteDe Culture Scores
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 intercept only Main effects Full Model
 Std B Se Std B Se Std B Se
intercept .12** .03** -2.53** .16 .12** .02
sex -** -** 41.20** 3.52 3.39** .29
age -** -** -10.02** 3.78 37.22** 1.54
education -** -** 34.99** 4.32 2.38** .35
supervisors -** -** -30.25** 2.90 -2.74** .29
professionals -** -** -35.20** 3.32 -3.10** .32
power distance -** -** -81.01** 45.06 -10.76** 5.17
uncertainty avoidance -** -** -42.17** 33.42 -12.52** 18.99
individualism -** -** 27.70** 42.82 1.27** 5.20
masculinity -** -** -78.07** 30.67 -14.29** 3.59
age2 -** -** -** - -38.72** 1.54
uncertainty avoidance2 -** -** -** - 7.74** 19.19
model: 
 Generalized X2 3,434.5** 3,383.3** 3,331.5
 -2 restricted log likelihood 14,947.6** 14,416.8** 13,828.0
 Δ df -** 10** 2
 Δ X2 -** 51.2** 51.8**
 country icc .21**
individual level variable labels are italicized. n = 40,864.  ** p < .01. * p < .05.  std B = standardized coefficients. age2 = age squared, uncer-
tainty avoidance2 = uncertainty avoidance squared. Δ df = change in degrees of freedom. Δ X2 = change in generalized X2. 
The data supported hypothesis 4. Age had a convex curvilinear relationship with 
union membership, with younger and older workers less likely to be union members. 
As shown in Tables 2 and 3, the significant main effect for age, combined with the 
significant effect for Age2, indicates the presence of a significant curvilinear relation-
ship. The nature of this relationship is illustrated in Figure 2: middle-aged persons 
were the most likely to be union members. Union membership among 15–29 year-
olds = 9%, 30–49 year-olds = 16%, and 50 years and up = 10%.
As shown in Table 2, the data supported hypotheses 5 and 6. Performance 
orientation was negatively related to union membership. There was a positive and 
significant relationship between institutional Collectivism and union membership 
in model 2. Although the relationship between in-group Collectivism and union 
membership was not significant, the sign was negative, as expected. The relationship 
between Hofstede’s individualism measure and union membership was not significant 
(Table 3). 
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There was mixed support for hypothesis 7. The GLoBE measure of Power 
Distance was not significantly related to union membership (Table 2). However, the 
Hofstede measure of Power Distance was negatively related to union membership, 
as expected (Table 3). 
As shown in Table 2, the data supported hypotheses 8 and 9. The relationship 
between Humane orientation and union membership was positive and significant 
(Model 3). The significant main effects for Uncertainty Avoidance and Uncertainty 
Avoidance squared indicated the presence of a curvilinear relationship between Un-
certainty Avoidance and union membership. The nature of this relationship is illustrat-
ed in Figure 2. At low and high levels of Uncertainty Avoidance, union membership 
was higher than at moderate levels, although Uncertainty Avoidance and Uncertainty 
Avoidance squared using Hofstede’s measures were not significant (Table 3).
Conclusion and discussion
This study extends prior research by integrating data from both individual (micro) 
and country (macro) levels of analysis by using a cultural-cognitive perspective. This 
opened the door to a deeper understanding of the relationships between national 
culture and union membership.
Collectivism. The data show that the Hofstede measure of individualism/Collectiv-
ism was not related to union membership, whereas the GLoBE measure of institu-
tional Collectivism was positively related to union membership. This suggests that it 
is the institutional aspect of Collectivism that drives union membership and not the 
in-group aspect of Collectivism. 
Comparing the findings from the country culture measures from GLoBE and 
Hofstede provides some insight into the meaning and construct validity of these com-
peting culture measures. institutional Collectivism is the primary driver of higher levels 
of union membership, while in-Group Collectivism was not significant but had the 
opposite sign. Hofstede’s unidimensional measure of individualism taps into both in-
stitutional and in-group facets of collectivism (Hofstede, 2001). Thus, the influence of 
Figure 2
Percent union Members by Age and Level of uncertainty Avoidance (gLoBe)
uncertainty avoidance
percent
union
members
age
20%
15%
10%
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these two different dimensions on union membership is confounded, explaining the 
lack of a significant relationship between Hofstede’s individualism and union density 
reported in prior studies.
Performance Orientation. By showing that the broadly defined measure of Mascu-
linity used by Hofstede that includes many different facets, and also the Performance 
orientation measure of GLoBE that is more narrowly focused, are both negatively 
related to union membership, we can surmise that the relationship between Mascu-
linity and union membership may be primarily driven by Performance orientation. The 
similarity of the negative relationships between union membership and both GLoBE 
Performance orientation and Hofstede Masculinity may help to explain why union 
membership is lower in countries with higher Masculinity. The achievement facet of 
Masculinity is probably driving people to avoid unions and to seek to achieve individ-
ual performance without a union. 
Age and Uncertainty Avoidance. By matching the inverted U-shaped relationship 
between union membership and age along with the U-shaped relationship between 
Uncertainty Avoidance and union membership, we can surmise that it may be un-
certainty avoidance that is a possible explanation for the relationship between age 
and union membership. There was a difference between the GLoBE and Hofstede 
measures of Uncertainty Avoidance and their impact on union membership. The in-
clusion of other dimensions in the Hofstede measure of Uncertainty Avoidance (e.g., 
value orientations, expected future outcomes) may have confounded the relationship 
between union membership and Uncertainty Avoidance to the degree that it was no 
longer significant.
in addition there was some evidence suggested that Power Distance was nega-
tively related to union membership. Humane orientation also had a positive relation-
ship with union membership. 
in general, the GLoBE culture scores were better predictors of union membership 
than were the Hofstede scores. This may have occurred because of differences in 
the conceptualization and measurement between GLoBE and Hofstede (McSweeney, 
2002). Alternatively, since the GLoBE scores were collected at a point closer in time to 
the collection of WVS survey data, changes in culture over time may have reduced the 
ability of Hofstede measures to predict the relatively more recent union membership 
data. Although this study used WVS data that was collected in the native languages 
in different countries, it must still be recognized that the meaning of union mem-
bership may be different in different countries. The estimates of union membership 
presented here are conservative and unlikely to recognize the higher rates of union 
coverage in some countries (Visser, 2006; Voos, 1983). 
The comparison of GLoBE with Hofstede enhances our understanding of similarity 
and differences of these measures, although, by relying on the data of others, this 
method did not permit direct measures of culture. This study suggests that unions 
seeking members, and employers seeking to avoid unionization should consider the 
significant cultural correlates of union membership. it also suggests that, since culture 
drives union membership, employers may use this knowledge to design appropriate 
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labour relations policies and conflict resolution practices that will be perceived as 
institutionally and collectively legitimate. 
Future research should explore other variables that may moderate the relation-
ships between culture and union membership reported in this study. For example, 
since there is evidence that the presence of union managed employment insurance 
is correlated with union density, future research may consider whether this is a cause 
or effect of union membership (Blasche, 2000; Western, 1997). However, this will 
require the availability of data from non-western and non-European countries on 
the availability of these Ghent systems. There is also evidence that public sector em-
ployment status influences union membership. Future studies that have access to 
individual reports of union membership and public sector employment status could 
explore this possibility.
Finally, it is important to remember that the meaning of belonging to a union 
is likely to vary significantly across countries. in some countries, it may be a matter 
of free choice, whereas in other countries there may be significant pressures from 
employers or political institutions that constrain the choice of individuals and induce 
them to become union members (olson, 1971). The differences across countries in 
these contextual pressures are an important topic for future research. 
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summary
National Culture and Union Membership: A Cultural-Cognitive 
Perspective
Moving beyond the normative and regulative perspectives of neo-institutional theory, 
this study adopted a cultural-cognitive perspective to study the influence of multiple 
dimensions of national culture on union membership. Cultural frameworks were 
compared using data from the World values Survey that were matched to GLoBE 
and Hofstede national culture scores (n = 43,867 employees, 32 countries). Contrasts 
between GLoBE and Hofstede scores revealed that GLoBE culture constructs were 
better predictors and they also enabled an improved understanding of the relationships 
between national culture and union membership. this resolved the paradoxical lack of 
a significant relationship between collectivism and union membership in prior research. 
Specifically, union membership was positively related to institutional collectivism but 
not to in-group collectivism. Also, that fact that GLoBE Performance orientation was 
negatively related to union membership explained why Hofstede’s Masculinity was 
negatively related to union membership in prior research. Moreover, prior research on 
union membership tended to use either individual level (i.e., employees) variables, or 
macro level (i.e., country) variables to explain union membership. recently developed 
statistical techniques enabled the analysis of both individual and country level variables 
in a hierarchical model. results show that union membership was positively related 
to sex (female), education, and institutional collectivism, and negatively related 
to occupation (supervisors and professionals) and performance orientation. there 
were curvilinear relationships between union membership and age and uncertainty 
avoidance. younger and older people were less likely to be union members. Low or high 
uncertainty avoidance increased union membership. the juxtaposition of the influences 
of Age and Uncertainty Avoidance on union membership revealed an interesting 
phenomenon. opposing curvilinear relationships (concave vs. convex), suggested a 
complex yet interrelated relationship between age and uncertainty avoidance that is 
worthy of future research. At different ages people may use uncertainty avoidance 
differently to evaluate the risks and benefits of union membership.
KEyWorDS: Unions, collectivism, performance orientation
rÉsumÉ
La culture nationale et la syndicalisation : une approche  
culturelle et cognitive
voulant aller au-delà des perspectives normatives et régulatrices de la théorie néo-
institutionnelle, cette étude se sert d’une perspective culturelle et cognitive pour 
étudier l’influence portée par les dimensions multiples d’une culture nationale sur la 
syndicalisation. Dans ce but, les structures culturelles ont été comparées en utilisant 
des données du World values Survey qui ont été associés aux résultats de GLoBE et 
Hofstede sur la culture nationale (n = 43 867 employées, 32 pays). Des contrastes entre 
les résultats de GLoBE et de Hofstede ont démontré que ceux de GLoBE fournissaient 
de meilleurs indices et qu’ils offraient une meilleure compréhension de la relation entre 
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la culture nationale et la syndicalisation. Ceci a résolu le paradoxe concernant l’absence 
d’un rapport important entre le collectivisme et la syndicalisation dans les recherches 
précédentes. 
Plus précisément, la syndicalisation a été associée de manière positive au collectivisme 
institutionnel, mais non pas au collectivisme en groupe. De plus, le fait que l’orienta-
tion de performance de GLoBE ait été associée de manière négative à la syndicalisation 
explique le rapport négatif entre la masculinité et la syndicalisation chez Hofstede dans 
les recherches précédentes. 
Par ailleurs, les recherches précédentes sur la syndicalisation ont utilisé en général 
soit des variables au niveau individuel (c’est-à-dire des employés), soit des variables au 
niveau macro (c’est-à-dire du pays) pour expliquer la syndicalisation. Des techniques 
statistiques développées récemment ont permis l’analyse à la fois des variables 
individuelles et nationales dans un modèle hiérarchique. Les résultats ont démontré 
que la syndicalisation était associée de manière positive au sexe (féminin), au niveau 
de scolarité et au collectivisme institutionnel; la syndicalisation était aussi associée, de 
manière négative, au travail (superviseurs et professionnels) et à l’orientation vers la 
performance.
Nous avons aussi observé des rapports curvilignes entre la syndicalisation et l’âge et le 
désir d’éviter l’incertitude. il est moins probable que les personnes plus jeunes et les plus 
âgées deviennent membres d’un syndicat. Un désir exceptionnellement bas ou haut 
d’éviter l’incertitude augmenterait la syndicalisation. La juxtaposition des influences 
de l’âge et du désir d’éviter l’incertitude sur la syndicalisation révèle un phénomène 
intéressant. Des rapports curvilignes opposés (concave et convexe) suggèrent un 
rapport complexe mais étroitement lié entre l’âge et le désir d’éviter l’incertitude qui 
mérite d’être approfondi dans des recherches ultérieures. il est possible que les gens 
d’âges différents se servent différemment du désir d’éviter l’incertitude pour évaluer les 
risques et les avantages de la syndicalisation.
MotS CLéS : syndicats, collectivisme, orientation de performance
resumen
La cultura nacional y el sindicalismo: una perspectiva  
cognoscitiva-cultural
Este estudio ha ido más allá de las perspectivas normativas y regulatorias de la teoría 
neo-institucional, al adoptar una perspectiva cognoscitiva-cultural para estudiar 
la influencia que las dimensiones múltiples de la cultura nacional tienen sobre el 
Sindicalismo. Se compararon los marcos culturales usando información de la Encuesta 
Mundial de valores y los índices nacionales de cultura de GLoBE y Hofstede (n = 43,867 
empleados, 32 países). El contraste entre los índices de GLoBE y Hofstede reveló que 
las construcciones culturales de GLoBE eran mejores pronósticos y pudieron brindar un 
entendimiento mejorado de las relaciones entre la cultura nacional y el Sindicalismo. 
Esto solucionó la paradójica falta de una relación importante entre el colectivismo y 
el Sindicalismo en estudios previos. De manera específica, el Sindicalismo se relacionó 
positivamente con el colectivismo institucional, pero no con el colectivismo grupal. 
Asimismo, el hecho de que la orientación de Desempeño de GLoBE se relacionara 
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negativamente con el Sindicalismo, explicó la razón por la que la Masculinidad de 
Hofstede fue relacionada de la misma manera, en investigaciones anteriores. Aún 
más, las investigaciones previas sobre el Sindicalismo tuvieron la tendencia a usar ya 
sea las variables de nivel individual (por ejemplo, los empleados) o las de nivel macro 
(por ejemplo, el país) para explicar la misma. Las técnicas estadísticas desarrolladas 
recientemente hicieron posible el análisis tanto de las variables a nivel individual como de 
las nacionales, en un modelo jerárquico. Los resultados demostraron que el Sindicalismo 
estaba relacionado de manera positiva con el sexo (femenino), educación y colectivismo 
institucional y se relacionaba de manera negativa con la ocupación (supervisores y 
profesionales) y la orientación del desempeño. Se percibe una relación curvilínea entre 
el Sindicalismo y la edad y la tendencia a eludir situaciones de incertidumbre. Era menos 
probable que las personas más jóvenes o de mayor edad, pertenecieran a un sindicato. 
Una mayor o menor tendencia a eludir situaciones de incertidumbre aumentaba 
el Sindicalismo. La yuxtaposición de la influencia de la edad y la tendencia a eludir 
situaciones de incertidumbre sobre el Sindicalismo reveló un fenómeno interesante. 
Las relaciones curvilíneas opuestas (cóncavas contra convexas), sugirieron una relación 
compleja, aunque interrelacionada, entre la edad y la tendencia a eludir situaciones 
de incertidumbre, que vale la pena investigar a futuro. A diferente edad, las personas 
pueden utilizar de diferente manera la tendencia a eludir situaciones de incertidumbre 
con el fin de evaluar los riesgos y beneficios del Sindicalismo. 
PALABrAS CLAvES: sindicatos, colectivismo, orientación de rendimiento
